If It’s Not Broken, then Why Fix It? The U.S. Supreme Court Signals a Shift Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in \u3ci\u3eNorthwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder\u3c/i\u3e, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) by Wasserburger, Corey J.
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 2 Article 5 
11-2010 
If It’s Not Broken, then Why Fix It? The U.S. Supreme Court Signals 
a Shift Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 
2504 (2009) 
Corey J. Wasserburger 
University of Nebraska, coreywasserburger@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Corey J. Wasserburger, If It’s Not Broken, then Why Fix It? The U.S. Supreme Court Signals a Shift Under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 129 
S. Ct. 2504 (2009), 89 Neb. L. Rev. (2010) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol89/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB203.txt unknown Seq: 1 29-NOV-10 14:33
Note*
If It’s Not Broken, then Why Fix It?
The U.S. Supreme Court Signals a
Shift Under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act in Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2504 (2009)
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I. INTRODUCTION
With its decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder,1 the U.S. Supreme Court sounded a warning
shot across the bow of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.2  This warn-
ing shot was prompted by the “big question”3 raised by the “small util-
ity district”4 from Texas; namely, whether the provisions of Section 5,
which prevent subject jurisdictions from making any changes in elec-
tion procedure without advance clearance from authorities in Wash-
ington, D.C., are unconstitutional.  Although it withheld judgment on
the issue by electing to employ the principle of constitutional avoid-
ance,5 the Court made clear that the preclearance requirements under
Section 5 implicated significant constitutional concerns, noting in par-
ticular the “federalism costs” of Section 5 and the scope of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.6
In Northwest Austin, the Supreme Court avoided ruling on the con-
stitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by providing relief
under Section 4 and granting the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District the ability, as a political subdivision, to bail out of the
preclearance requirements of Section 5.7  While this approach dis-
posed of the case, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion went through consid-
erable pains to comment upon the current status of the Voting Rights
Act, as renewed in 2006.8  In its decision, the Court recited an impres-
sive list of the “undeniable” accomplishments of the Act, which was
only surpassed by the number of issues which gave the Court con-
cern.9  These concerns, which focus upon issues of federalism and the
scope of the Fifteenth Amendment, appear to provide the Court with
the impetus to do something unprecedented: invalidate a key provi-
sion of the Voting Rights Act.10
1. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
3. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2508.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2513.
6. Id. at 2511 (noting Section 5’s “federalism costs” and its reach beyond the man-
dates of the Fifteenth Amendment).
7. Id. at 2513.
8. Id. at 2511–13.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Since its original enactment in 1965, Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act has enjoyed the consistent support of the Court, which has upheld
the Section’s constitutionality in the face of every challenge.11 How-
ever, Northwest Austin signals that this support may erode in the near
future, if the Court has not shifted its stance already.  Central to this
occurrence will be the standard that the Court chooses to apply to any
future constitutional challenges to Section 5.12  As noted by the Court,
the competing standards are the “congruence and proportionality” test
and the “rational means” test.13  However, the current Court has sum-
marily stated that “serious constitutional questions” exist even under
the lower standard of the “rational means” test.14  This statement,
above all else, may be the most telling indicator of the Court’s new-
found discomfort with the provisions of Section 5.
Although its ultimate holding relied upon constitutional avoid-
ance,15 Northwest Austin is significant because it signals a coming
shift in the Court’s jurisprudence.  Not only an invitation for future
challenges to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Northwest Austin
reveals that the deference once paid to congressional fact-finding, at
least under the Voting Rights Act, may well have reached its end.
This Note will examine the implications of Northwest Austin upon
what is arguably the most successful piece of civil rights legislation in
our nation’s history.  In Part II, this Note will examine the history of
constitutional challenges to the Voting Rights Act and similar legisla-
tion.  In addition, this Note will demonstrate the emerging importance
of federalism, as embodied in “New Federalism,” as the dominant par-
adigm through which future challenges to the Voting Rights Act may
be analyzed.  Finally, Part III will analyze how the Court’s opinion in
Northwest Austin foreshadows the Court’s shift in support for the Vot-
ing Rights Act, perhaps dooming the preclearance provisions of Sec-
tion 5.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 5 and Congressional Fact-Finding
1. The Voting Rights Act
The Fifteenth Amendment provides that the “right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on ac-
11. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282–85 (1999); City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S.
526, 534–35 (1973); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
12. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2512.
13. Id.  (citing Appellant’s Brief at 31, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009
WL 453246; Brief for the Federal Appellee at 6, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No.
08-322), 2009 WL 819480).
14. Id. at 2512–13.
15. Id. at 2513.
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count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”16  Congress is
vested with the power “to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.”17  Accordingly, the Voting Rights Act has been described as “a
complex scheme of stringent remedies” purposed to “rid the country of
racial discrimination in voting.”18  Specifically, Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act “forbids any ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ that ‘results
in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color.’”19
Instead of relying on piecemeal litigation to address the flagrant
violations of voters’ rights, Congress fashioned the Voting Rights Act
as a remedy to “directly pre-empt[ ] the most powerful tools of black
disenfranchisement in the covered areas.”20 Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act requires that any covered state or political subdivision may
not enact a change in voting “standard, practice, or procedure” with-
out showing that the change “does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color.”21  In short, the effect of Section 5 was to suspend all
changes in state election procedure for covered jurisdictions “until
they were submitted to and approved by a three-judge Federal District
Court in Washington, D.C., or the Attorney General.”22  Covered juris-
dictions are defined under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which
provides “a formula defining the States and political subdivisions” to
which the preemptive remedy applies.23  Although the measures pro-
vided by Section 5 may appear stringent, a covered jurisdiction has
the option of “bailing out” of the preclearance requirements if it can
establish a number of facts.24
The Voting Rights Act was originally enacted in 1965, and it was
initially authorized for five years.25  It has been subsequently
reauthorized by Congress a number of times, including: in 1970, when
it was extended for five years; in 1975, when it was extended for seven
years; in 1982, when it was extended for twenty-five years, and in
2006, when it was extended for another twenty-five years.26
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
18. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1965).
19. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2509 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006)).
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
22. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2509.
23. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315.
24. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2509 (noting that a jurisdiction must show the fol-
lowing: that it has not used a forbidden voting test in the previous ten years, that
it has not been subject to any valid objection under Section 5, that it has not been
found liable for any other voting rights violations, and that it has engaged in
constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of voters).
25. Id. at 2510.
26. Id.
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2. South Carolina v. Katzenbach
The first challenge to the Voting Rights Act was presented to the
U.S. Supreme Court less than one year after President Johnson
signed the original bill into law.27  In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
the State of South Carolina filed a bill of complaint seeking a declara-
tion that provisions of the Voting Rights Act were unconstitutional
and requesting an injunction to prevent enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act by the U.S. Attorney General.28  The Supreme Court took
original jurisdiction over the matter and expedited the case because of
South Carolina’s upcoming primary elections, which were to be held in
June 1966.29  The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged sections of
the Voting Rights Act, including Section 5, were “an appropriate
means for carrying out Congress’s constitutional responsibilities” and
denied South Carolina’s requested injunction.30
In affirming the Voting Rights Act, the U.S. Supreme Court also
validated the “voluminous legislative history” which Congress com-
piled in support of the Act.31  The Supreme Court summarized the
majority reports of the House and Senate Committees, and noted the
legislative record documented “in considerable detail the factual ba-
sis” behind Congress’s decision to address voter discrimination.32
Further, the Court commented on the “great care” with which Con-
gress explored the “problem of racial discrimination in voting”33 and
cited the significant amount of time that Congress spent on debate
and hearings.34 As later cases would illustrate, this kind of intensive
congressional fact-finding would become a common theme in the
Court’s decisions upholding the Voting Rights Act.
3. City of Rome v. United States
The U.S. Supreme Court was again faced with a challenge to the
Voting Rights Act in City of Rome v. United States.35  In that case, the
City of Rome, Georgia, challenged the Attorney General’s refusal to
grant preclearance to a number of annexations and electoral changes
to the City’s local government, specifically to the City Commission and
Board of Education.36  These changes dated back to 1966, when the
General Assembly of Georgia substantially altered the electoral pro-
27. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
28. Id. at 307.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 308.
31. Id. at 309.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 308.
34. Id. at 308–09.
35. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
36. Id. at 159–62 (explaining changes to the City’s charter).
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cess and local government structure of the City of Rome through
amendments to the City’s charter.37
Although these changes fell within the purview of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, as each constituted a “standard, practice, or proce-
dure with respect to voting,”38 the City of Rome failed to seek
preclearance for these changes, as well as sixty annexations made by
the City between November 1, 1964, and February 10, 1975.39  The
City’s oversight was not brought to the attention of the Attorney Gen-
eral until June 1974, when Rome submitted one annexation for
preclearance.40  This prompted numerous inquiries by the Attorney
General and eventually led the City to submit all the annexations and
the 1966 electoral changes for preclearance.41  The Attorney General
ultimately refused to grant preclearance to the electoral changes as
well as a number of the annexations.42  The City of Rome then filed an
action for declaratory judgment with a three-judge court, pursuant to
the Voting Rights Act, and appealed that court’s decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court.43
Among the City of Rome’s various challenges was the assertion
that, while appropriate in 1965, the Voting Rights Act had outlived its
usefulness by 1975, when it was extended by Congress for an addi-
tional seven years.44  In response to this challenge, the Supreme
Court again recognized the legislative findings of Congress and re-
fused “to overrule Congress’s judgment.”45  In rejecting the City of
Rome’s assertion, the Court not only deferred to Congress’s findings,
but it also noted the “careful consideration” which Congress applied in
deciding to readopt Section 5’s preclearance requirement.46
4. City of Boerne v. Flores
The factual findings of Congress were given further credence in a
case that, at least facially, had very little to do with the Voting Rights
Act.  In City of Boerne v. Flores,47  the U.S. Supreme Court considered
a challenge to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,48 which
37. Id. at 160.
38. Id. at 161 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 161–62 (explaining the process for changes, what was allowed, and what
was denied)
43. Id. at 162.
44. Id. at 180.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 181.
47. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
48. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
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was an act passed by Congress in direct response49 to the Court’s deci-
sion in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith.50  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act sought to
nullify the decision in Smith by restoring the “compelling interest
test” as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner51 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.52
Specifically, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act prohibited the
government from:
‘substantially burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demon-
strate the burden ‘(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.’53
The Supreme Court ultimately found the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment,54 but not before comparing
Congress’s findings under that Act to those which supported the Vot-
ing Rights Act.55
In reviewing the congressional factual findings underpinning the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Supreme Court utilized as a
measuring stick the legislative record which accompanied the Voting
Rights Act.56  The Court noted that under the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act, Congress failed to document “examples of modern in-
stances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious
bigotry.”57  This was in stark contrast to the legislative record that
accompanied the Voting Rights Act, which had provided documented
evidence of “subsisting and pervasive discriminatory—and therefore
unconstitutional—use of literacy tests.”58  While the Court did not
consider the lack of a detailed factual record to be the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act’s most glaring flaw, it did find the factual inade-
quacy of the record in comparison to the Voting Rights Act to be
“instructive,” and the Court subsequently overturned the Act.59
Katzenbach,60 City of Rome,61 and City of Boerne62 established a
long line of support for congressional fact-finding under the Voting
49. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–13.
50. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
51. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515–16 (quoting Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) § 2000bb-1, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
54. Id. at 513.
55. Id. at 530.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 525–26 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333–34 (1966)).
59. Id. at 529–31.
60. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
61. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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Rights Act.  Not only did Congress’s legislative record become a relia-
ble justification for the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act,63
but it also served as a model against which other congressional acts
were to be judged.64  The deference which the Court provided to Con-
gress’s legislative record became a hallmark of the Court’s jurispru-
dence under the Voting Rights Act, a characteristic that is curiously
absent in Northwest Austin.65
B. Northwest Austin Facts and Holding
1. Facts and Procedural History
Formed in 1987, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One (the District) was established to deliver certain city ser-
vices, including bond issuance and tax assessment, to residents of a
section of Travis County.66  The District was governed by a board of
five members and was responsible for its own elections, even though it
did not register its own voters.67  Although there was no evidence that
the District had ever discriminated on the basis of race, it was still
subject to the provisions of Section 5 because the State of Texas had
been designated as a state subject to federal preclearance.68
Prior to 2004, the District’s elections had been held at residences
precleared by the federal government.69  In 2004, the District entered
into a contractual relationship with Travis County, wherein the Dis-
trict delegated the responsibility for its elections to Travis County and
thus allowed the District’s nominees to appear on the same ballot as
other county officials.70  This arrangement was also precleared by the
federal authorities and continued as the operative mode of elections
for the District after 2004.71
The District filed an action for declaratory relief with the federal
district court in   Washington, D.C., on August 4, 2006, asking the
court to rule that it satisfied the bailout provisions of the Voting
Rights Act, or, in the alternative, that Section 5 was unconstitu-
tional.72  The District filed its action eight days after Congress
reauthorized Section 5.73
62. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
63. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309; City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180.
64. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529–31.
65. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
66. Appellant’s Brief at 8, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 453246.
67. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2510.
68. Id.
69. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 66, at 9.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 10.
73. Brief for the Federal Appellee at 4, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009
WL 819480.
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A three-judge panel rejected the District’s initial contention that it
was entitled to bail out of the Act’s preclearance requirements on the
basis that only a State or political subdivision is permitted to pursue a
bailout.74  The court held that the District failed to meet the definition
of a political subdivision because only “counties, parishes, and voter-
registering subunits” qualify as political subdivisions.75  The three-
judge panel then considered the District’s constitutional argument.  It
ruled that Congress’s twenty-five year extension of Section 5 was con-
stitutional under both the lower “rational-basis” standard and the
much more demanding “congruence and proportionality standard.”76
2. Majority Opinion
After summarizing the substantive provisions of Voting Rights Act
at issue and the procedural posture of the case, the majority in North-
west Austin praised the “historic accomplishments of the Voting
Rights Act.”77  After one scant paragraph of praise, however, the
Court began enumerating the “substantial ‘federalism costs’” which
Section 5 imposes upon the subject jurisdictions.78  The Court in-
cluded among these costs Section 5’s prohibition against “all changes
to state election law—however innocuous—until they have been
precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D.C.”79 and the Vot-
ing Rights Act’s overarching differentiation “between the States, de-
spite [the] historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal
sovereignty.’”80
Most prominent in the Court’s criticism, though, was the assertion
that “[t]he evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concen-
trated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”81  More spe-
cifically, the Court took issue with the fact that the 2006
reauthorization retained the data set from 1972 as the baseline for
determination of eligibility for preclearance.82  Arguing that the Act’s
coverage formula is based on data more than thirty-five years old, the
Court called attention to the possibility that the most recent enact-
ment may fail to account for “current political conditions.”83  Although
the Court seemed to begrudgingly note that the improvements which
74. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232
(D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129
S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 283.
77. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2511.
78. Id. at 2511 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
79. Id. at 2511 (emphasis supplied).
80. Id. at 2512 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2510.
83. Id. at 2512.
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have occurred “are no doubt due in significant part to the Voting
Rights Act itself,”84 the Court was quick to state that “the Act imposes
current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”85
The Court’s comments seem to indicate considerable hostility to-
ward the continued constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act.86  This hostility is a significant departure from the Court’s estab-
lished deference to legislative fact-finding in particular, especially
considering the Court’s only references to the legislative record ne-
gated, rather than supported, the continuing need for the Voting
Rights Act.87  In fact, the Court failed to acknowledge a single aspect
of the legislative record which showed a continuing need for the
preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act.88
After producing a litany of criticisms in regard to the current
reauthorization, the Court finally broached what had appeared likely
to be the heart of decision: a ruling on whether a “congruence and pro-
portionality” standard or a “rational basis” standard is to be applied to
Section 5.89  This issue, in particular, had been briefed extensively by
the parties,90 as well as by amici.91  While, the Court noted the disa-
greement between the parties over the proper standard,92  it summa-
rily stated without further analysis that it “need not resolve it,” but
the Court also added that the “Act’s preclearance requirements and its
84. Id. at 2511.
85. Id. at 2512.
86. Id. at 2511–13.
87. Id. at 2512 (recounting warnings from supporters of the Act concerning the lack
of systematic differences between covered and non-covered states).
88. Id. at 2511–12.
89. Id. at 2512.
90. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, supra note 66, at 32–37 (arguing for the “congruence
and proportionality” standard from City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); Brief for
the Federal Appellee, supra note 73, at 16–25 (arguing for a deferential standard
of review to be applied to congressional acts which seek to enforce constitutional
guarantees).
91. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Ass’n in Support of Appellees
at 17–20, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 796295; Brief of the
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees at 33–37, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 797589;
Brief of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Appellees at 16–21, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL
815232; Amicus Curiae Brief of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of
Appellant at 7–20, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 526208;
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. in Support of Appellant at
6–19, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL 526207; Brief of Amicus
Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation Goldwater Institute in Sup-
port of Appellant at 13–16, Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322), 2009 WL
507024.
92. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2512.
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coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions under either
test.”93
With that abrupt summary, the Court transitioned to the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance and provided alternative relief to the Dis-
trict by permitting it to seek preclearance as a political subdivision.94
3. Dissenting Opinion
The lone dissenting opinion was offered by Justice Thomas.95  In
his opinion, he argued that the Court improperly applied the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance.96  While the majority offered alternative
relief in the form of permitting the District to seek preclearance, Jus-
tice Thomas argued that the District had not sought the opportunity to
seek preclearance, but rather bailout itself.97  Accordingly, Justice
Thomas maintained that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance was
unavailable because an interpretation that makes the District eligible
for bailout “does not render § 5 constitutional.”98
Most notably, however, Justice Thomas makes clear that the ma-
jority’s opinion is a warning to Congress regarding the extent of its
powers under the Fifteenth Amendment.99  It would seem that this
warning should be heeded with regard to the Voting Rights Act.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Rise of “New Federalism”
According to Justice O’Connor, the purpose of federalism is to “en-
sure against federal tyranny by dividing power between state and fed-
eral governments.”100  The immediate question, however, becomes
what fear of tyranny arises from Congress’s legislative expansion of
individual rights?101  Perhaps best of all, this question encapsulates
the irony surrounding the interplay between the protections of the
Voting Rights Act and the federalism considerations highlighted by
the opinion in Northwest Austin.  Arguably, the Voting Rights Act pro-
vides one of the most dramatic backdrops for the continuing evolution
of federalism, as embodied in the current paradigm of “New Federal-
ism.”  It is this paradigm, and its lack of deference to congressional
93. Id. at 2513.
94. Id. at 2513–17.
95. Id. at 2517–27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2517.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2518.
99. Id. at 2519.
100. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the Rehnquist
Court?, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 589, 595 (2006).
101. Id.
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findings, which will likely shape future challenges under the Voting
Rights Act.
1. The Rehnquist Court
Over the course of nearly twenty years, the Rehnquist Court devel-
oped a unique jurisprudence that was simultaneously “conserva-
tive”102 and “activist.”103  This activism cannot be overstated, since
the Rehnquist Court “overturned more acts of Congress than all previ-
ous Supreme Courts combined.”104  This arguably radical strain of
constitutional interpretation colored a wide field of landmark cases,
which respectively reshaped the Commerce Clause,105 the Tenth
Amendment,106 the Eleventh Amendment,107 and the Fourteenth
Amendment.108  In developing and applying its doctrine of “New Fed-
eralism,” the Rehnquist Court sought to establish “meaningful limits
on Congressional power.”109  Chief Justice Rehnquist himself de-
scribed the Court’s role under this process as “delineating, and then
policing, the ‘distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local.’ ”110
However, critics have charged that the Rehnquist Court’s activist
approach to questions of federalism was rooted in “a deeply problem-
atic vision of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the na-
tional political system.”111  More specifically, critics allege that the
Rehnquist Court disregarded the “need to defer to judgments by Con-
gress as a coordinate branch of government,” and instead assumed the
role of “sole authoritative expositor of constitutional values in the na-
102. Id. at 590 (noting that much of the conservative agenda of the Rehnquist Court
was accomplished under the doctrine of federalism).
103. Id. (noting that a recurring theme in Rehnquist Court decisions was the need to
curb Congress’s authority).
104. Id. (quoting Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies, 91 A.B.A. J. 38, 41 (2005)).
105. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (ruling that the targeted activity
under the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not substantially affect interstate
commerce).
106. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (ruling that the congressional
Act regarding radiation disposal impermissibly allowed the federal government
to commandeer the legislative function of the states).
107. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (ruling that Congress did not have the
authority to subject the states to private suits in state court unless sovereign
immunity had been waived).
108. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (ruling that the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
109. Theodore W. Ruger, New Federalism—Introduction, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89,
89 (2004).
110. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68).
111. Thomas O. Sargentich, The Rehnquist Court and State Sovereignty: Limitations
of the New Federalism, 12 WIDENER L.J. 459, 462 (2003).
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tion.”112  This assumed role has been described as “sovereignty over
constitutional interpretation.”113
Regardless of whether one believes that the Rehnquist Court po-
liced the boundary between national and local issues or instead as-
sumed the role of constitutional sovereign, the “New Federalism” of
the Rehnquist Court undeniably altered the well-established standard
of judicial restraint, which generally required only the application of a
rational basis test to an act of Congress that did not burden an indi-
vidual’s rights.114  This standard of judicial restraint was first articu-
lated in a footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.115
Described as “the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law,”116
this brief synopsis established the basis of judicial restraint: that the
Court should focus its “formidable powers of judicial review on pro-
tecting individual rights, not on displacing general economic or social
policies chosen by Congress and approved by the President in stat-
utes.”117  Accordingly, the Court has declared that “in general, [it]
should give deference to the findings and conclusions made by Con-
gress in enacting statutes.”118
The Rehnquist Court, however, “moved far beyond base-line ra-
tionality review in developing the new federalism.”119  Instead, the
Rehnquist Court adopted “much more demanding and particularized”
requirements for statutes that appeared to implicate state sovereignty
issues.120  For instance, in City of Boerne, the Court ruled that the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act was neither “congruent” nor
“proportionate” to the supposed objectives of the Act.121  Aside from
invalidating the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, this novel
formula concocted by the Court not only departed from the Court’s
112. Id.
113. Id. at 463; see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword:
We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (2002) (“There is . . . a world of difference
between having the last word and having the only word: between judicial
supremacy and judicial sovereignty.  We may choose to accept judicial
supremacy, because we need someone to settle certain constitutional questions
. . . .  But it does not follow either that the Court must wield its authority over
every question or that, when it does, the Court can dismiss or too quickly sup-
plant the views of other, more democratic institutions.”) (emphasis supplied).
114. Sargentich, supra note 111, at 463–64.
115. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
116. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087
(1982).
117. Sargentich, supra note 111, at 464.
118. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (“The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative judgments ‘is a par-
adigm of judicial restraint.’”) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 314 (1993)).
119. Sargentich, supra note 111, at 465.
120. Id.
121. 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997).
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traditional standard of judicial restraint, but it also carried serious
implications for other congressional acts under the Fourteenth
Amendment.122  Accordingly, the Rehnquist Court established a para-
digm under which a successful challenge to the Voting Rights Act be-
came a viable possibility.123
B. The Scope of the Fifteenth Amendment
1. Congressional Authority Under Section 2
Arguably, the heart of Congress’s authority to adopt the Voting
Rights Act can be found under the Fifteenth Amendment.124  Specifi-
cally, Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides, “The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”125  Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment pro-
vides that, “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”126  In addition, the Court has read Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment “coextensively” with the enforcement
powers under the Fifteenth Amendment.127
Beginning with its review of the Voting Rights Act in Katzenbach,
the Court “gave considerable deference to congressional determina-
tions about the means necessary to ‘enforce’ the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.”128  In doing so, the Court ruled that Congress had not exceeded
its authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment in enacting
the Voting Rights Act.129  Similarly, in City of Rome, the Court pro-
vided considerable deference to Congress’s enforcement powers by
holding that it was proper for the Voting Rights Act to address not
only those changes in voting procedure which were purposefully dis-
criminatory, but also those which had a discriminatory impact.130
Perhaps the most notable aspect of City of Rome, however, is then-
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, in which he argues that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments limited the application of the Voting
Rights Act to only those instances were discriminatory intent could be
122. Levinson, supra note 100, at 594 (“[T]he principle that acts of Congress must pass
a rigid ‘congruent and proportionality’ test threatened other civil rights provi-
sions enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment to expand individual liberty.”).
123. Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne:
The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 794–95 (2003).
124. Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of
the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178 (2005).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
127. Hasen, supra note 124, at 178–79 (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
373 n.8 (2001)).
128. Id. at 181.
129. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966).
130. 466 U.S. 156, 177 (1980).
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shown.131  While Rehnquist’s dissent failed to convince a majority of
his colleagues, it did portend the “seismic shift” that ensued as a re-
sult of Rehnquist’s “New Federalism.”132
Not surprisingly, the Court’s view of Congress’s ability to interpret
and enforce the Constitution has been modified as the doctrine of New
Federalism gained prominence.133  Moving away from its interpreta-
tions under Katzenbach and City of Rome, the Court’s holding under
Boerne provides substantially less deference to Congress’s determina-
tion of appropriate legislation by imposing the proportionality and
congruence requirement.134  In other words, the Court determined
that “Congress may enforce constitutional rights, but the set of consti-
tutional rights is determined by the Court.”135  Absent the ability to
identify substantive rights, Congress is left with a remedial power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the boundaries of which the
Court seems to have left ill-defined.136
Following Boerne, then, there appear to be two lines of authority:
one in which Congress is given wide latitude under the Fifteenth
Amendment to enforce substantive voting rights137 and another in
which Congress has virtually no authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce any constitutional rights other than those
identified by the Court.138  It appears that a potential conflict exists,
at least in regard to the extent that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments are actually “coextensive.”139
C. Future Application
1. Proper Standard?
While the Court’s decision in Northwest Austin disposed of the case
by providing the District with the option to seek preclearance, the con-
stitutionality of Section 5 remains vulnerable.140  The issue will likely
be delayed for several years as litigation develops, but another chal-
lenge is very likely after the next two or three years.141
131. Hasen, supra note 124, at 182–83.
132. Id. at 183.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 184–85.
135. Calvin Massey, Two Zones of Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008).
136. Hasen, supra note 124, at 185.
137. See City of Rome v. United States, 466 U.S. 156 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
138. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
139. Hasen, supra note 124, at 177.
140. Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on NAMUDNO: Chief Justice Roberts Blinked,
ELECTION LAW BLOG (Jun. 22, 2009, 8:00 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/
013903.html.
141. Id.
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While the make-up of the Court cannot be foreseen at this time, the
key issues likely to confront the Court are somewhat clearer.  As the
Court somewhat casually noted in Northwest Austin, “The parties do
not agree on the standard to apply in deciding whether . . . Congress
exceeded its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power.”142  While it
concisely framed the issue, the Court did not specifically indicate
whether it would adopt the “congruence and proportionality” standard
from City of Boerne or the “rational means” standard which had vindi-
cated the Voting Rights Act under Katzenbach.143
While this determination has been identified by some as being cen-
tral to any future ruling, it may not even prove to be determinative.144
Instead, the federalism concerns highlighted earlier in the Court’s de-
cision will likely play a much larger role, which will mean that little
deference is afforded to the congressional findings that supported the
Act.  As the Court noted, “serious constitutional questions”145 exist
under either test.  In light of this language and the Court’s litany of
qualms over the continued application of a law that was based on fac-
tors that “may no longer be concentrated in jurisdictions singled out
for preclearance,”146 it is entirely likely that future challenges will be
met with a heavy dose of New Federalism, severely limiting the
chances of the preclearance requirements surviving even a rational
basis test.
IV. CONCLUSION
With its ruling in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled a coming
shift in its interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.  Specifically, the
deference which it once paid to legislative fact-finding will no longer
suffice to sustain the protracted extensions of the Act.  Due in large
part to the rise of New Federalism, the Court has assumed an asser-
tive role in the nation’s debate over the continued necessity of the pro-
tections afforded to minorities under the Voting Rights Act.
Regardless of one’s opinion of the appropriateness of the Court’s ap-
proach, a change has been signaled.  It is entirely likely, in light of the
well organized efforts of some groups, that another challenge to the
Act will face the Court in the near future.  If Northwest Austin is any
indication, the days of the most successful piece of civil rights legisla-
tion in this country’s history may be numbered.
142. 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009).
143. Id.
144. Id. (noting that the preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise se-
rious constitutional questions under either test).
145. Id. at 2512–13.
146. Id. at 2512.
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